“The Days of La La Land Are Over”

President Ilves, in a 2023 interview with the Dutch weekly De Groene Amsterdammer, you identify with neo-idealism in foreign policy. You said that we, as Baltic countries, pursue moralistic, neo-idealist geopolitics. What does neo-idealism mean to you?

“At the time, it was a new term, coined by Benjamin Tallis, that I had just read about. It stands for a values-based foreign policy, but highlights even more strongly the contrast to the realist, transactional foreign policy that has gained ground in the last decades in the West. That trend must be criticised, because realist foreign policy actually isn’t very realistic.

We saw this principle being acted upon after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A US-led coalition drove out Iraqi forces and restored Kuwaiti independence because you cannot annex a country. It's a fundamentally moral position, but it’s under pressure because of Russia’s aggression against its neighbours. If the United States, for example, were to recognise the annexation of Crimea, they would wipe out the whole basis of their foreign policy after the Second World War.”

Which politicians or thinkers do you consider to be figureheads of neo-idealism?

“Well, geopolitical analyst Benjamin Tallis is the one who came up with the term. Václav Havel, with his classic essay The Power of the Powerless, was a very important precursor. Kaja Kallas certainly has been the most vocal proponent of neo-idealism over the last years. I think we should also count Carl Bildt, the former Swedish prime minister, among the neo-idealists. In German foreign policy, I would say, only Joschka Fischer and Annalena Baerbock have been prominent proponents of the neo-idealist worldview.

Personally, I don’t use the term that often. I prefer to talk about 'the approach of the Eastern Europeans' or 'post-WW2 liberal foreign policy' as pursued by the US after 1945 – though not always consistently. The bottom line is that if you want to prevent war, you must stand up for fundamental values. And this policy only works if you back it up with force. Otherwise, it all just sounds good and you end up with the foreign policy of Western Europe and the US since 2008, when they let Russia get away with the invasion of Georgia.”

Is it possible to build bridges between neo-idealism – or liberal foreign policy – and anti-colonialism?

“If there is one area in the world that has been exploited for colonial gain by great powers, it’s Eastern Europe. Our countries have never been colonisers themselves. The EU, of which we are now a part, is not colonising anyone either. Yes, some of the EU’s member states were colonial powers. The formerly colonised should turn to these countries to resolve their issues. There is no reason to call Eastern Europe to account for colonialism. The refusal of so many practitioners of post-colonial studies to treat the Soviet Union’s and Russia’s actions in Eastern Europe – in the past and present – as imperialism and colonialism makes me not take them seriously.

Much of the Global South has discredited itself by not taking a moral stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I don’t see why I must care about your issues if you don’t care about ours. Ukraine has probably been more murderously exploited than almost any country, maybe except for the Congo under Belgian and Namibia under German rule. If you look at the Ukrainians’ colonial experience and don’t care about what is going on right now, why the hell should I care about what the Belgians were doing in the late 19th century in the Congo?”

How can Europe stop Russian imperialism?

“Europe won’t be able to build an efficient defence unless it implements a bunch of reforms. The European Union has been unwilling to take any serious steps, such as unified capital markets and mutualised debt. This prevents it from growing and having an effective tech sector. Without decisive reforms, this place is going to turn into a museum. Well, unless the Russians invade, in which case it will all look sort of like the Donbas.

Europe is increasing its defence spending. Is it possible to avoid a negative impact on policies that protect our broader security and social services?

“I don’t believe that controversial budget cuts can be avoided if we want to bolster our defence. One of the few other options is to borrow money, but this is hard for a lot of countries because they’ve already maxed out on borrowing.

We must realise that the days of La La Land are over. We’re no longer in this post-Cold War era which gave us the peace dividend. During the Cold War, defence spending was between 5 and 6 per cent of GDP. Europe finds itself in a similar threat environment again. Perhaps even worse, because the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War never invaded an independent country – with Afghanistan being the one exception. At the time, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia weren’t really independent, as satellite states of the Soviet Union, so the Soviet army’s interventions to quell uprisings were considered domestic affairs. In short, we need to return to a level of defence spending comparable to that during the Cold War. This will require painful measures.”

What about taxing the wealthy in order to finance defence?

“We'll have to see if that is feasible. But the alternative is being invaded. In Estonia, people are whining about the new motor vehicle tax. What do they think will be left of their car after the Russians have gone on a rampage like they did in the Ukrainian city of Bucha?”

Small countries such as the Baltic states have a great interest in European solidarity. How do we build it?

“The problem is that only people in the frontline countries understand the existential nature of the Russian threat. On the other hand, just to be fair, our part of Europe doesn’t fully understand the legitimate security concerns of the EU countries bordering the Mediterranean. This partly explains their reluctance to do anything about Russia. The North of Europe must show greater solidarity with the South when it comes to their concerns about immigration from Africa and the Middle East.

You can make the case that what Russia did in Syria led to the migration crisis of 2015, that it was even meant to burden Europe with refugees. I would like to say to Europeans: that was 1.5 million refugees, and you went ballistic. Now think about the fact that there are some 35 million Ukrainians in Ukraine. 7 million have left since 2022. How many people are going to stay there if Russia gets its way and subjugates the country? Not many, I think. Maybe 4 or 5 million will stay behind, take their chances. Let’s say that 30 million people will try to escape from Ukraine. Where are they going to go? They will come to Europe.”